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Abstract: In this paper, we study the evolution of US divorce rates across states, 
from 1956 to 1998. Using a cluster algorithm, we identify different groups of 
states that converge on each other in the evolution of their divorce rates. We find 
strong empirical support for the club classification. For the whole 1956–1998 
period, we find evidence of convergence in divorce rates for the majority of the 
states, but when we split the sample, a different pattern emerges. In the pre-
unilateral divorce reform period (1956–1972), we find that most of the states had 
converging divorce rates within several convergence clubs, but the club 
classification of states significantly changed in the post-reform period (1973–
1998). Finally, we analyze the explanatory factors of the club classification of 
states in both sub-periods, using geographical, socio-economic, and 
demographic variables. 
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1. Introduction 
In an influential article, Friedberg (1998) analyzed the effect of the no-fault unilateral 
divorce laws of the 1970s on the evolution of the US divorce rate. Using a state-based 
panel of divorce data from 1968 to 1988, Friedberg found that the adoption of unilateral 
divorce laws had a permanent influence on divorces, accounting for almost one-sixth of 
the rise in the divorce rate since the late 1960s. Later, Wolfers (2006) replicated 
Friedberg’s exercise, extending the data period (from 1956 to 1998) and adding 
variables that explicitly model the dynamic response of divorce. Wolfers’ results show 
that the no-fault unilateral divorce reforms had a positive effect on the divorce rate, but 
the effect was transitory; after a decade, no effect on the divorce rate could be 
discerned. These findings have been widely accepted, and this methodology has been 
used by others to analyze the dynamic response of divorce rates in other countries (for 
instance, González and Viitanen (2009) study the effect of divorce laws on a sample of 
European divorce rates).1 In this paper, we do not pretend to explore the transitory or 
permanent impact of divorce law reforms on divorce rates; rather, we examine whether 
the transition to more liberal divorce laws implied a convergence of divorce across US 
states’ divorce rates. 
The liberalization of divorce laws leads to a decrease in the costs associated with 
divorce, which can make divorce more feasible. From a theoretical point of view, the 
number of divorces, and thus the divorce rate, would increase, since a greater number of 
couples value the now less-expensive divorce over marriage, although, as Becker (1981) 
argued, divorce law reforms may not affect the probability of marriage breakdown, 
since they only affect property rights. Following the Coase Theorem, under mutual 
consent divorce, the party who wants to divorce has to compensate their spouse, in such 
a way that mutual consent gives considerable power to spouses who do not want a 
divorce. The change to a unilateral system transfers the right to divorce to the spouse 
most wanting a divorce. In this case, it is the party who wants to continue married who 
must compensate the spouse who wishes to leave. When the re-assignment of property 
rights between spouses is accompanied by transfers between them, no changes in the 
divorce rate should be observed. Then, if the divorce rates across several states do not 
                                                 
1 Of course, there are more determinants of divorce; e. g., child custody and child support laws 
(González-Val and Marcén, 2012), economic growth (South, 1985), price stability (Nunley, 2010), 
unemployment (Amato and Beattie, 2011), the birth-control pill (Marcén, 2014), and culture (Furtado et 
al., 2013). 
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converge in the pre-reform period, the introduction of divorce law reforms would not 
generate divorce convergence. If the divorce rates in the pre-reform period do converge 
across some states, then, after the law changes, we should observe the same 
convergence. Nonetheless, the aggregate divorce rate will change when compensation 
between spouses is not possible (see, for example, Allen, 2002). In this case, if divorce 
rates converge in the pre-reform period for a group of states, it would be possible to 
observe non-convergence in the post-reform period, since divorce rates vary after the 
law changes, or there may be convergence in different groups, depending on the law 
reforms passed. A similar response may be possible if the divorce rates do not converge 
in the pre-reform period. 
The study of the evolution of divorce rates is considered important in the 
literature since divorce has been suggested as having an impact on both women and 
children. The possibility of divorce may increase female labor force participation, 
(Michael, 1985; Johnson and Skinner, 1986; Peters, 1986; Parkman, 1992), but it can 
also affect the economic status of divorced women and their children (Jarvis and 
Jenkins, 1999; Bedard and Deschênes, 2005). Divorce may also have a negative effect 
on the psychological well-being of children (Seltzer, 1994; Amato, 2000; Gruber, 2004; 
Gähler and Palmtag, 2014). 
To analyze divorce convergence in the US, we utilize the Phillips and Sul (2007) 
panel convergence method on a sample of fifty US states and the District of Columbia, 
for the period 1956 to 1998. This methodology does not require any specific 
assumptions concerning the stationarity of the divorce rate, our variable of interest, 
and/or the existence of common factors. This cluster algorithm has been extensively 
used in the economic literature, for example, to explore convergence in the cost of 
living across US cities (Phillips and Sul, 2007), price convergence (Fischer, 2012), the 
historical population convergence of the US cities (González-Val and Lanaspa, 2014), 
the income convergence of member states of the European Union (Fritsche and Kuzin, 
2011; Bartkowska and Riedl, 2012), outcome convergence within the US (Choi and 
Wang 2015), and even the happiness club convergence in Europe (Apergis and 
Georgellis, 2014), among others. We add to this literature by exploring whether divorce 
rates converge across US states. 
Our findings suggest that there was convergence in divorce rates across most of 
the US states. We find empirical evidence of convergence clubs when we use the whole 
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sample in the analysis, and most of the states (35) are classified within the same 
convergence club. However, after dividing the sample into two periods, pre-reform 
(1956-1972) and post-reform (1973-1998), our results show that, in the pre-reform 
period, most of the states were converging in divorce rates within several convergence 
clubs, but the club classification significantly changed in the post-reform period. Then, 
even if the effects of divorce law reform were transitory, and disappeared after a decade, 
as suggested by Wolfers (2006), these results would point to the reforms as a main 
determinant of changes in the club classification. Finally, by using a logit model, we 
analyze the factors affecting the likelihood of two states to belong to the same club, 
using geographical, socio-economic, and demographic variables. 
Section 2 presents the data used. In Section 3, we apply the cluster algorithm to 
identify different groups of states that converge with each other, and we explore 
potential determinants of the test results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data 
We use the same dataset as Wolfers (2006), testing the dynamic response of the divorce 
rate to a change in the legal regime that governs divorce, using data on the states’ 
divorce rate between 1956 and 1998. The divorce rate ( DR ) is defined as the annual 
absolute number of divorces per thousand inhabitants in each state (the source is the 
Vital Statistics of the United States). 
This is known as the crude divorce rate and represents the standard measure of 
the level of, and changes in, divorce. Nevertheless, this rate could be affected by the 
marital status structure of the populations to it relates. Divorce rates may be low either 
because marriage rates are low, or because marriages are less likely to end in divorce. 
To examine this issue, we could have used another measure of divorce rates, defined as 
the annual number of divorces per 1000 married population, but this analysis would 
have been less reliable due to the scarcity of data on the total number of marriages, 
which is only available when each census is collected, normally every 10 years (see 
Furtado et al., 2013; Marcén, 2014). 
 Table 1 incorporates information on the year in which no-fault unilateral reforms 
were passed. Since 1968, 31 states introduced no-fault unilateral reforms, with most of 
those reforms taking place during the late 1960s and 1970s, with only two exceptions of 
reforms implemented in the 1980s, following Gruber’s (2004) classification. 
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Unfortunately, information on the divorce rate is not available for all states during all 
the period considered (see Table 1). As we explain in detail below, for three states, 
(California, Indiana, and Louisiana) the analysis cannot be carried out because of data 
limitations. Table 1 also incorporates a summary of statistics of the divorce rates across 
states. There are important variations in the average divorce rates, with 15 states having 
an average divorce rate greater than 5 (the highest being Nevada, at 18.6), 27 states with 
an average divorce rate between 3 and 5, and 9 states with divorce rates lower than 3, 
(the lowest was 2.3, in the states of  Massachusetts and New York). The considerable 
dissimilarities in the gap between the minimum and maximum divorce rates in each 
state are also notable. For example, in the case of New Mexico, we observe a minimum 
divorce rate of 1.5 and a maximum of 9.1, while in Pennsylvania the minimum was 1 
and the maximum 3.5. 
3. Results 
3.1. Convergence clubs across states 
To explore the evolution of US divorce rates across states, we apply a cluster algorithm 
that allows us to identify different groups of states that converge with each other in the 
evolution over time of their divorce rates. The cluster procedure is based on the log 
−t test (Phillips and Sul, 2007, 2009), which focuses on the evolution over time of 
idiosyncratic transitions in relation to the common component. Other papers have 
studied the evolution of divorce rates from a time series perspective, such as that of 
González-Val and Marcén (2012), where the path of the common component of state 
divorce rates is analyzed through panel unit root tests.2 This new approach is different 
from that of prior empirical studies of growth convergence clubs, such as the regression 
tree analysis used by Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and the predictive density of data 
used by Canova (2004) to identify different clusters of countries or regions. The 
procedure of Phillips and Sul focuses on the evolution over time of divorce rate relative 
to the average rather than on individual divorce rate by state. Thus, their methodology 
enables us to identify the relative transitions that occur within subgroups, and to 
measure these transitions against the correlative of a common trend (Phillips and Sul, 
2009). The regression model of the log −t test is 
                                                 
2 They find that the unit root null hypothesis cannot be rejected for most states, even when one or multiple 
structural breaks are allowed. 
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 ( itDR  is the divorce rate of state i  at time t .). These relative 
transition coefficients exclude the common growth path ( )tμ  by scaling, measuring 
state i ’s transition element relative to the cross-section average. This means that ith  
traces out state i ’s individual trajectory relative to the average, so Phillips and Sul 
(2009) call ith  the ‘relative transition path.’ Moreover, ith  also measures for each state 
i  the departure of divorce rate from the common growth path tμ  in relative terms. 
Thus, Eq. (1) simply represents a time series regression; the null hypothesis is 
convergence across all states, and the alternatives include no convergence and partial 
convergence among subgroups of states. As the t-statistic of the test refers to the 
coefficient 1β  of the tlog  regressor in Eq. (1), the test is called the ‘ tlog ’ convergence 
test. It is important to note that not only the sign of the coefficient 1β  of tlog , but also 
its magnitude, measures the speed of convergence, so that the higher the value of the 
coefficient the faster the rate of convergence.  
The cluster procedure performs the tlog  test for each of the groups and stops 
when the group of remaining states does not satisfy the convergence test. First, it 
defines an initial core primary group, and other groups are then formed according to 
certain criteria that maximize the value of the t-statistic. A much more detailed 
explanation of the constructive steps of the procedure can be found in Phillips and Sul 
(2007, 2009). 
Figure 1 shows the path of all the states and demonstrates that it is not easy to 
infer any specific pattern. However, it seems clear that around the beginning of the 
1970s there is a rise in the trend of divorce rates in all the states, followed by a 
subsequent fall in the second half of the 1980s. Wolfers (2006) identified the 1969–
1977 period as the reform period, in which 28 states adopted unilateral divorce, but in 
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most of these states the law changed in the first three years of the 1970s (see Table 1),3 
so the vertical red line indicates the intermediate year 1972.4 The fall in rates in the 
1980s, a decade later, coincides with the temporal duration of the effects of the 
unilateral reforms estimated by Wolfers (2006).5   
Table 2 shows the results of applying the cluster algorithm to our sample of 
states.6 We consider three periods: 1956–1972 (pre-reform period), 1973–1998 (post-
reform period) and 1956–1998 as a whole. The “club” column shows the number of 
states that are members of each group. The distribution of states within groups can be 
found in Table 3. From 1956 to 1998, the algorithm classifies states into three groups, 
revealing three different steady divorce rates in the US. Three remaining states 
(California, Indiana, and Louisiana) are excluded because the algorithm requires a 
balanced panel dataset, and Wyoming is not classified into any club. In each group, the 
estimated coefficient 1βˆ  is significant, strongly supporting the club classification. The 
majority of the states (35) are classified into group 3, indicating convergence among the 
majority when the whole period is considered. Figure 2 shows the path over time of the 
divorce rate of the states in each convergence club. 
The number of groups and their composition significantly changes if we split the 
sample into two periods. When we consider the pre-reform period (1956–1972) the 
cluster procedure identifies five groups. California, Indiana and Louisiana are excluded 
due to data limitations and Wyoming is not classified into any club, again. The 
coefficient 1βˆ  is significant for all groups, supporting the club classification. The results 
show that, in this pre-reform period, most of the states, classified into five different 
convergence clubs, were converging in divorce rates within each club. Figure 3 displays 
the evolution of the divorce rates by club. However, when we focus on the post-reform 
period (1973–1998), we see a different picture. The algorithm classifies the states into 
six homogeneous groups (four of them contain 10 states). Two remaining states are not 
classified into any club (Nevada and Wyoming), and for these the convergence 
                                                 
3 González-Val and Marcén (2012) find that many of the structural breaks detected in the state series are 
located in that brief period (1970–1973). 
4 We have tried different intermediate years to split the sample and the qualitative results are maintained. 
5 Although González-Val and Marcén (2012) suggest that the long-run effect of divorce law reforms on 
the divorce rate observed by Wolfers (2006) may be the result of both unilateral reforms and changes in 
the aftermath of divorce. 
6 The estimations were performed with the Gauss code kindly provided by Donggyu Sul on his webpage. 
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hypothesis is rejected; California, Indiana, and Louisiana are excluded because of 
missing data. Figure 4 shows the path over time of the divorce rate of the states by club.  
Figure 5 illustrates the transitional movements across state groups over time. 
This figure lists the states in each club, based on the clustering results obtained for the 
pre-reform period, 1956 to 1972. The figure also displays the changes in club 
membership that had taken place by 1998, considering the club classification obtained 
when considering the whole period, 1956 to 1998. The results show that there are 
transitions to clubs 2 and 3 when the post-reform period is included in the sample. 
There are 29 new members in Club 3, coming from all the other clubs. About 50% of 
the states in Club 1 move to Club 3 over the later time period; another 5 states move to 
Club 2. Most of the states initially classified in Club 2 move to Club 3, and all the states 
in Clubs 4 and 5 (which eventually disappear), move to Club 3. Finally, all the states 
from Club 3 remain in the same group. Summarizing, there is strong empirical support 
for a transition in divorce rates across states, and evolving membership of convergence 
clubs. Our findings suggest that unilateral divorce reforms could lead to convergence 
across states as most of them end up in the same convergence club (Club 3) after the 
divorce law reforms. This may indicate that divorce law reforms helped to homogenize 
divorce rates across states.  
3.2. Determinants of the club classification 
To analyze how state characteristics affect the likelihood that any pair of states become 
members of the same convergence club, we estimate a logit model. The dependent 
variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if two states belong to the same club for each 
possible pair, and 0 otherwise. 
 We use several explanatory variables. The first two are related to the 
geographical distance between each pair of states, sharing a border, and a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if both states are in the same region.7 Second, we consider 
political and legal differences; several dummy variables control for whether the 
unilateral divorce and the joint custody reform laws were approved the same year in the 
two paired states, and whether the governors in both states are from the same party (in 
the initial year). Third, we measure the demographic similarity between states, 
considering the absolute difference in several variables: state population (ln scale), the 
                                                 
7 We consider eight regions: New England, Mideast, Great Lakes, Plains, Southeast, Southwest, Rocky 
Mountain and Far West. 
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percentage of women who finished high school, the percentage of women with one or 
more years of college, the female labor-force participation rate, and the marriage rate. 
Finally, to account for economic differences between states, we include the absolute 
difference in the per capita personal income (ln scale). All the differences are calculated 
from the average values of the period considered. The data on governor by state is taken 
from Sobel and Raimo (1978). Data on educational variables, and on the female labor- 
force participation rate are obtained from the Current Population Survey and from the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata (Ruggles et al. 2010).8 The marriage rate is obtained 
from the Vital Statistics of the US. Lastly, population and per capita personal income 
data are taken from the US Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis). 
Table 4 shows the results of the logit estimations. We analyze the club 
classification in two sub-periods: 1956–1972 (pre-reform period), 1973–1998 (post-
reform period). The whole period (1956–1998) is not considered, since most of the 
states are classified within the same convergence club. We report the estimated 
coefficients, their corresponding robust standard deviation (in parentheses), and the 
marginal effects. The results of the models, including all explanatory variables, are 
shown; nested models adding different sets of the variables do not change the results.9  
 We obtain some results common to both sub-periods. First, the location of states, 
measured by the variables sharing a border and same region, has no effect, so the club 
classification is not driven by geographical patterns. Second, the dummies controlling 
for whether the unilateral divorce and the joint custody reform laws were approved in 
the same year in the two-paired states, are also not significant. Previously, we argued 
that the main explanatory factor of the change in the composition of groups over time is 
unilateral divorce law reform, so we split the sample in 1973, the year in which most of 
the states approved the reform. Nevertheless, the dummy variable is not significant, 
because in the pre-reform period the states had not yet approved the reform, and in the 
post-reform period most had already changed the law. Third, the difference in the 
average marriage rate is the only significant variable in both sub-periods. The estimated 
coefficient is negative, pointing to the similarity in marital patterns as a key determinant 
of the club classification. Finally, differences in state population, and the percentage of 
women who finished high school, are not significant. 
                                                 
8 Information on Alaska, District of Columbia, and Hawaii is not available, so all the two-state pairs 
including any of these three states are excluded from the sample.  
9 Results of the nested models are available from the authors upon request. 
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 We also obtain evidence of the particular influence of certain variables in one of 
the two sub-periods. Thus, if two states have a governor from the same party in 1973, 
they are more likely to be members of the same convergence club in the post-reform 
period. Furthermore, there is a significant negative correlation between female labor- 
force participation rates and the probability of belonging to the same club in the 1973–
1998 period. Thus, two states with a similar share of female workers have a greater 
probability of belonging to the same club. In the pre-reform period, larger differences in 
the percentage of women with one or more years of college, and variations in personal 
income, reduce the probability of being in the same club. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the evolution of US divorce rates across states, using data for 
the period 1956-1998. We utilize a cluster algorithm that allows us to identify dissimilar 
convergent growth of divorce rates by state, finding strong support for the club 
classification. The empirical evidence shows that, in the whole period considered, there 
was a clear convergence in divorce rates across states, since the majority (35) are 
classified within the same convergence club. Nevertheless, there are significant 
variations in the number of groups and their composition when we split the sample in 
two sub-periods: pre-reform (1956–1972) and post-reform (1973–1998).  
Our findings suggest that the liberalization of divorce laws implied a divorce 
convergence across the US. When we examine transitions between groups over time, we 
observe that most of the states move from one club to another. The analysis of the 
transitions reveals that unilateral divorce reform may lead to convergence across states, 
as most end up in the same convergence club. Therefore, divorce law reforms helped to 
homogenize divorce rates across states. Finally, we study what factors can help to 
explain the club classification in the two sub-periods. No geographical pattern can be 
deduced and, although some of the determinants change over time, the similarity in 
marital patterns, measured by differences in the marriage rate, is a key determinant of 
the club classification; two states with a similar marriage rate have a greater probability 
of belonging to the same club in both sub-periods. 
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Figure 1. States’ divorce rate paths, 1956–1998 
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Note: Nevada is not included because its extremely high divorce rate distorts the graph. 
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Figure 2. States’ convergence clubs, 1956–1998 
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Note: Nevada is not shown within Club 3 because its extremely high divorce rate distorts the 
graph. 
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Figure 3. States’ convergence clubs, 1956–1972 
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Figure 4. States’ convergence clubs, 1973–1998 
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Figure 5. Transitioning to Clubs 2 and 3 
 
 Club 1: (21)        Club 3: (6)      
                    
  Massachusetts          Alabama       
  New Jersey          Florida       
  New York     Club 2: (14)     Mississippi       
  North Dakota            Missouri       
  Utah      Rhode Island      Oregon       
        Wisconsin      West Virginia       
  North Carolina                   
  Pennsylvania                 Club 4: (4)  
  South Carolina                       
  South Dakota      Connecticut             Alaska   
  Vermont      Delaware             Arkansas   
        Georgia             Colorado   
        Hawaii             Oklahoma   
        Idaho                 
        Maine             
        Montana             
        New Mexico             
        Ohio             
        Tennessee           Club 5: (2)  
        Texas                 
        Virginia             Arizona   
  District of Columbia                    Nevada   
  Illinois                     
  Iowa                 
  Kansas                 
  Kentucky                 
  Maryland                 
  Michigan                 
  Minnesota                 
  Nebraska                  
  New Hampshire               
  Washington               
                  
 
 
Notes: Transitions between groups. Club classification in 1956–1972 versus club 
classification in 1956–1998. 
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Table 1. State divorce rates: Descriptive statistics 
 
State    Unilateral  Observations Average Max. Min.  State    Unilateral  Observations Average Max. Min. 
 Alabama   1971 1956–1998 5.4 6.9 3.2  Montana   1973 (1975) 1956–1998 4.6 6.5 2.7 
 Alaska   1935 1956–1998 5.8 9.0 2.4  Nebraska   1972 1956–1998 3.1 4.3 1.5 
 Arizona   1973 1956–1998 6.4 8.1 3.7  Nevada   1967 (1973) 1956–1998 18.6 36.6 8.1 
 Arkansas   . 1956–1998 5.7 8.0 2.8  New Hampshire  1971 1956–1998 4.0 5.9 1.7 
 California   1970 1956–1990 4.6 6.1 2.9  New Jersey   . 1956–1998 2.4 3.9 0.7 
 Colorado   1972 (1971) 1956–1998 5.0 7.6 2.7  New Mexico   1933 (1973) 1956–1998 5.6 9.1 1.5 
 Connecticut   1973 1956–1998 2.8 4.6 1.0  New York   . 1956–1998 2.3 3.8 0.4 
 Delaware   1968 (.) 1956–1998 3.6 5.5 1.2  North Carolina   . 1956–1998 3.6 5.3 1.2 
 District of Columbia  . 1956–1998 3.5 7.3 1.4  North Dakota   1971 1956–1998 2.5 3.6 0.8 
 Florida   1971 1956–1998 5.9 7.4 3.8  Ohio   . 1956–1998 4.0 5.5 2.2 
 Georgia   1973 1956–1998 4.6 6.4 2.1  Oklahoma   1953(.) 1956–1998 6.6 8.2 4.6 
 Hawaii   1972 (1973) 1956–1998 3.7 5.3 1.2  Oregon   1971 (1973) 1956–1998 5.0 6.8 3.0 
 Idaho   1971 1956–1998 5.5 7.0 3.6  Pennsylvania   . 1956–1998 2.5 3.5 1.0 
 Illinois   . 1956–1998 3.5 4.6 1.8  Rhode Island   1975 (1976) 1956–1998 2.6 3.8 1.0 
 Indiana   1973 1956–1990 5.1 7.6 1.7  South Carolina   . 1956–1998 3.0 4.6 1.0 
 Iowa   1970 1956–1998 3.1 4.4 1.5  South Dakota   1985 1956–1998 2.8 4.2 0.9 
 Kansas   1969 1956–1998 4.2 5.8 2.2  Tennessee   . 1956–1998 5.1 6.9 2.4 
 Kentucky   1972 1956–1998 4.1 6.4 2.1  Texas   1970 (1974) 1956–1998 5.1 6.9 3.6 
 Louisiana   . 1971–1983 3.4 4.3 2.5  Utah   1987 (.) 1956–1998 4.1 5.4 1.5 
 Maine   1973 1956–1998 4.0 5.6 2.0  Vermont   . 1956–1998 3.3 5.3 1.2 
 Maryland   . 1956–1998 3.0 4.1 1.7  Virginia   . 1956–1998 3.4 4.8 1.7 
 Massachusetts   1975 1956–1998 2.3 3.7 1.1  Washington   1973 1956–1998 5.3 7.3 3.2 
 Michigan   1972 1956–1998 3.7 4.9 1.8  West Virginia   . 1956–1998 4.0 5.6 1.8 
 Minnesota   1974 1956–1998 2.7 4.0 1.1  Wisconsin   1978 (.) 1956–1998 2.6 3.9 0.9 
 Mississippi   . 1956–1998 4.2 5.8 2.3  Wyoming   1977 1956–1998 6.1 8.5 3.6 
 Missouri   . 1956–1998 4.3 5.7 2.6             
 
Note: Year of unilateral divorce is from Gruber (2004) and from Friedberg (1998) in parentheses. 
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Table 2. State convergence clubs 
 
1956–1998  1956–1972 1973–1998 
Club 1βˆ  (t-statistic)  Club 1βˆ  (t-statistic) Club 1βˆ  (t-statistic) 
1 [5] -0.633 (-1.572)  1 [21] 0.223 (0.421) 1 [2] -1.099 (-0.601)
2 [7] -1.406 (-1.576)   2 [14] 0.324 (0.835) 2 [10] -1.037 (-1.099)
3 [35] -0.132 (-0.531)  3 [6] -0.036 (-0.100) 3 [10] -0.812 (-0.903)
   4 [4] 0.649 (0.496) 4 [10] -0.882 (-0.778)
   5 [2] -0.004 (-0.012) 5 [4] -0.157 (-0.408)
     6 [10] -1.229 (-1.566)
 
Notes: The numbers in brackets are the number of states. The corresponding t-statistic 
in the regression is constructed in the usual way by using HAC standard errors. At the 
5% level, the null hypothesis of convergence is rejected if the t-statistic < -1.65. All the 
t-statistics reported are higher than -1.65, indicating that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis at 5% in any case. 
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Table 3. States within clubs 
State Club (1956–1972) Club (1973–1998) Club (1956–1998) State Club (1956–1972) Club (1973–1998) Club (1956–1998) 
Alabama 3 3 3 Montana 2 4 3 
Alaska 4 3 3 Nebraska 1 1 3 
Arizona 5 6 3 Nevada 5  3 
Arkansas 4 6 3 New Hampshire 1 3 3 
California    New Jersey 1 2 1 
Colorado 4 6 3 New Mexico 2 3 3 
Connecticut 2 2 3 New York 1 2 1 
Delaware 2 4 3 North Carolina 1 5 2 
District of Columbia 1 5 3 North Dakota 1 2 1 
Florida 3 6 3 Ohio 2 3 3 
Georgia 2 6 3 Oklahoma 4 3 3 
Hawaii 2 6 3 Oregon 3 3 3 
Idaho 2 6 3 Pennsylvania 1 2 2 
Illinois 1 4 3 Rhode Island 2 1 2 
Indiana    South Carolina 1 4 2 
Iowa 1 2 3 South Dakota 1 3 2 
Kansas 1 4 3 Tennessee 2 6 3 
Kentucky 1 2 3 Texas 2 4 3 
Louisiana    Utah 1 4 1 
Maine 2 4 3 Vermont 1 4 2 
Maryland 1 3 3 Virginia 2 6 3 
Massachusetts 1 2 1 Washington 1 5 3 
Michigan 1 4 3 West Virginia 3 5 3 
Minnesota 1 2 3 Wisconsin 2 2 2 
Mississippi 3 3 3 Wyoming    
Missouri 3 6 3     
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Table 4. Estimation results from logit model 
 
  1956–1972 1973–1998 
Share a border 0.043 (0.264)  0.172 (0.324) 
 0.008   0.009  
Same region 0.168 (0.235)  0.054 (0.302) 
 0.031   0.003  
Same year unilateral divorce reform -0.194 (0.354)  -0.367 (0.474) 
 -0.033   -0.016  
Same year joint custody reform 0.161 (0.246)  0.211 (0.284) 
 0.030   0.012  
Governor from the same party (initial year) 0.009 (0.147)  0.506*** (0.177) 
 0.001   0.026  
Abs. Dif. Average Ln Population 0.138 (0.090)  -0.113 (0.109) 
 0.025   -0.006  
Abs. Dif. Average % Female Some College -7.311* (3.764)  3.958 (3.694) 
 -1.305   0.206  
Abs. Dif. Average % Female High School 5.422 (3.527)  0.354 (3.402) 
 0.968   0.018  
Abs. Dif. Average Female labor force participation 0.028 (0.021)  -0.060** (0.026) 
 0.005   -0.003  
Abs. Dif. Average Marriage rate -0.014*** (0.004)  -0.227*** (0.064) 
 -0.002   -0.012  
Abs. Dif. Average Ln Per capita personal income -1.143* (0.594)  0.968 (0.830) 
 -0.204   0.050  
Observations 1128     1128   
Wald (p-value) 25.57 (0.007)  30.32 (0.001) 
Pseudo R2 0.024     0.049   
 
Notes: Parameter estimates, (robust standard errors) and marginal effects. All 
regressions include a constant. 
